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Croatia

Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation

Summary

The 2002 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) indicated that out of the 30 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, Croatia implemented 4, partially implemented 25, and did not implement 1 principle. The IMF concluded that there was considerable room for improvement in the securities supervisory framework, particularly with respect to the powers of the Croatian Securities and Exchange Commission (CSEC), inspection and surveillance procedures, as well as the cooperation between the CSEC and the Croatian National Bank (CNB). In a follow up assessment conducted in 2004, the IMF reported that there had been substantial changes in the securities supervisory framework, such as the enactment of the Securities Market Law and the Takeover Law in 2002. Moreover, on January 1, 2006, Croatia established the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (CFSSA), which assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance. According to the 2005 European Bank for Restructuring and Development (EBRD) Securities Market Legislation Assessment, Croatia's securities legislation was found in "high compliance" with the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation published by the IOSCO. The EBRD recommended enhancing the effective implementation and enforcement of securities regulations.

    General Overview

    In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) of Croatia and concluded that there was considerable room for improvement in the securities supervisory framework, particularly with respect to the powers of the Croatian Securities and Exchange Commission (CSEC), inspection and surveillance procedures, as well as the cooperation between the CSEC and the Croatian National Bank (CNB). The assessment indicated that out of the 30 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Core Principles, Croatia implemented 4, partially implemented 25 and did not implement 1 principle.
    In 2004, the IMF published an update to the FSSA and stated that there have been "substantial changes" (p. 10) in the securities supervisory framework. Particularly, in 2002 Croatia enacted the Securities Market Law and the Takeover Law. The new Securities Market Law (1) introduced mandatory listing requirements for all public limited companies that issue shares in a public offering or have certain minimum size; (2) allowed banks to conduct securities business; (3) strengthened disclosure requirements; and (4) enahnced supervisory powers of the CSEC. The Takeover Law gave the CSEC supervisory powers with respect to takeovers. These powers include the authority to approve announcements of takeover offers, receive a broader range of information and documents relating to takeovers, and supervise the parties in a takeover.
    The 2002 Securities Market Law, the 2002 Takeover Law, the 2005 Law on Investment Funds, and the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency primarily govern the securities market. The Croatian capital markets are supervised by two different institutions, namely the Croatian National bank (CNB) and the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (CFSSA). The CNB supervises credit institutions and similar financial institutions, and the CFSSA supervises the securities market, pension funds, and insurance companies. The CFSSA was established in January 2006 and replaced the Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, the CSEC, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). The CFSSA is a member of the IOSCO (IOSCO website).
    The 2005 European Bank for Restructuring and Development (EBRD) Securities Market Legislation Assessment found Croatia in "high compliance" with the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation published by the IOSCO. "The legislation was found to be sound in all areas under consideration. Croatian authorities should now concentrate on improving effective implementation and enforcement issues, while continuing to refine current legislation" (EBRD 2007, p. 9).
    The two stock exchanges in Croatia are the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the Varaždin Stock Exchange (VSE) (IMF 2004).


    The Principles

    1. The responsibilities of the regulator should be clear and objectively stated.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle

    2. The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle

    3. The regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle

    4. The regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle

    5. The staff of the regulator should observe the highest professional standards, including appropriate standards of confidentiality.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle

    6. The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence, to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.

    According to the 2002 IMF FSSA, the ZSE and the VSE have inspection and limited market surveillance authority. However, there insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    7. SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and delegated responsibilities.

    According to the 2002 IMF FSSA, the ZSE and the VSE have inspection and limited market surveillance authority. However, there insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    8. The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance powers.

    As of 2004, the Securities Market Law granted the former CSEC inspection, investigation, and surveillance powers (IMF 2004). On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    9. The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers.

    The 2004 IMF update to the FSSA reported that the Securities Law gave the former CSEC more enforcement powers than the previous legislation; particularly, the CSEC had the authority to withdraw a license from a broker. The IMF stated that with the enactment of Securities Market Law, "the enforcement authority of the [CSEC] was clarified and strengthened in terms of scope, appeal procedures, and legal immunity of enforcement officers" (2004, p. 10).

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    10. The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compliance program.

    The 2004 IMF update to the FSSA reported that the Securities Law granted the former CSEC inspection, investigation, and surveillance powers gave it more enforcement powers than the previous legislation; particularly, the CSEC had the authority to withdraw a license from a broker. The IMF stated that with the enactment of Securities Market Law, "the enforcement authority of the [CSEC] was clarified and strengthened in terms of scope, appeal procedures, and legal immunity of enforcement officers" (2004, p. 10).

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    11. The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-public information with domestic and foreign counterparts.

    According to the 2004 IMF update to the FSSA, the Securities Law required the former CSEC to share relevant information and cooperate with other national and European Union (EU) regulators; however, the information exchange was conducted only on an ad-hoc basis.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    12. Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they will share both public and non-public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.

    According to the 2004 IMF update to the FSSA, the Securities Law required the former CSEC to share relevant information and cooperate with other national and European Union (EU) regulators; however, the information exchange was conducted only on an ad-hoc basis.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    13. The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers.

    According to the 2004 IMF update to the FSSA, the Securities Law required the former CSEC to share relevant information and cooperate with other national and European Union (EU) regulators; however, the information exchange was conducted only on an ad-hoc basis.

    On January 1, 2006, Croatia established the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    14. There should be full, timely and accurate disclosure of financial results and other information that is material to investors’ decisions.

    The 2004 IMF update to the FSSA stated that the 2002 Securities Law incorporated the recommendations the IMF made in its 2002 FSSA with respect to extended disclosure requirements. Accordingly, the Securities Market Law requires making public the identity of the 10 largest owners of any security. Moreover, the stock exchanges introduced rules, which enable any participant in the trading system to gain access to information that could affect the price and securities.

    15. Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and equitable manner.

    The 2004 EBRD Corporate Governance Sector Assessment assigned a rating of medium compliance to Croatia's legislation when assessed against the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance. According to the EBRD, the Company Law requires all shareholders of the same class to be treated equally. However, shareholder restrictions regarding voting rights and/or procedures at a shareholders meeting are not specified in law. Furthermore, there are no specific provisions protecting minority shareholders.

    16. Accounting and auditing standards should be of a high and internationally acceptable quality.

    According to the Deloitte IAS Plus website, under the Croatian Accounting Law, these entities are required to apply International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs): (1) listed companies and those that are preparing to go public; (2) financial institutions; (3) large enterprises; (4) other companies as required by financial sector supervisory authorities; and (5) companies that are required to prepare consolidated financial statements according to IFRSs. Deloitte emphasizes, however, that IFRSs applied are a translated version as of March 31, 2004. Therefore, as of May 2007, IFRSs 6, 7 and 8 have not been translated or published, and some amendments to International Accounting Standards (IASs) and IFRSs since March 31, 2004 have not been incorporated into Croatian accounting requirements. All other enterprises may either apply IFRSs or use standards adopted by the Financial Reporting Standards Board (FRSB); as of May 2007, these standards are IASs as they existed in 2000. According to a 2007 self-assessment published by the Croatian Association of Accountants and Financial Experts (CAAFE), the FRSB will prepare national accounting standards for private sector entities that decide not to apply IFRSs. The standards will be a short version of IFRSs.

    In its 2006 Doing Business Guide, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) states that the Audit Act requires audits to be carried out in accordance with International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). Obligatory annual audits are required for (1) consolidated financial statements; (2) all joint-stock companies; (3) limited partnerships and limited liability companies whose total revenue for the year prior to the year subject to the audit amounts to over HRK 30 million; (4) banks, insurance companies, investment and pension funds, pension insurance companies and other regulated companies; and (5) all related companies, regardless of their size, if the controlling company is subject to mandatory audit. All other companies are audited pursuant to their own rules, i.e., the Memorandum of Incorporation or the Articles of Association. The Croatian Chamber of Auditors (CCA) is a professional organization composed of audit companies, individual auditors, and certified auditors. It is responsible for the translation, publication, and implementation of auditing standards in Croatia and monitors the compliance of its members with the Audit Act, ISAs, and other professional audit rules. According to the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) on Accounting and Auditing conducted by the World Bank in 2002, at the time of the assessment, the translation and publication process was up to date with the result that audits were carried out in accordance with all ISAs and other pronouncements issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) as of 2002. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with the most recent versions of the ISAs.

    17. The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility and the regulation of those who wish to market or operate a collective investment scheme.

    The 2004 IMF report states that the amendments to the Law on Investment Funds address some of the recommendations the IMF made in its 2002 FSSA with respect to collective investment schemes. The new law assures that separate assets of an open-end fund would not be subject to claims against the investment company in the case of bankruptcy of the investment company. Further, it requires an arms-length relationship between an investment company and a depository bank and incorporates a clearer definition of related parties. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    18. The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the segregation and protection of client assets.

    The 2004 IMF report states that the amendments to the Law on Investment Funds address some of the recommendations the IMF made in its 2002 FSSA with respect to collective investment schemes. The new law assures that separate assets of an open-end fund would not be subject to claims against the investment company in the case of bankruptcy of the investment company. Further, it requires an arms-length relationship between an investment company and a depository bank and incorporates a clearer definition of related parties. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    19. Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s interest in the scheme.

    The 2004 IMF report states that the amendments to the Law on Investment Funds address some of the recommendations the IMF made in its 2002 FSSA with respect to collective investment schemes. The new law assures that separate assets of an open-end fund would not be subject to claims against the investment company in the case of bankruptcy of the investment company. Further, it requires an arms-length relationship between an investment company and a depository bank and incorporates a clearer definition of related parties. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    20. Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis for asset valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a collective investment scheme.

    In its 2002 FSSA, the IMF indicated that there was an ambiguity in the methodology for the calculation of net asset value of the fund. Furthermore, the IMF urged the Croatian authorities to ban related parties transactions.

    21. Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for market intermediaries.

    In its 2002 FSSA, the IMF revealed shortcomings in prudential regulation; particularly, the IMF pointed to a lack of staff to perform on-site inspections of intermediaries. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    22. There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the intermediaries undertake.

    In its 2002 FSSA, the IMF revealed shortcomings in prudential regulation; particularly, the IMF pointed to a lack of staff to perform on-site inspections of intermediaries. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    23. Market intermediaries should be required to comply with standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and under which management of the intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters.

    In its 2002 FSSA, the IMF revealed shortcomings in prudential regulation; particularly, the IMF pointed to a lack of staff to perform on-site inspections of intermediaries. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    24. There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors and to contain systemic risk.

    In its 2002 FSSA, the IMF revealed shortcomings in prudential regulation; particularly, the IMF pointed to a lack of staff to perform on-site inspections of intermediaries. However, there is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    25. The establishment of trading systems including securities exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight.

    In 2004, the former CSEC established a real-time trade monitoring system at the ZSE and VSE. According to the 2004 CSEC Annual Report, the new system enabled the CSEC to carry out full and comprehensive supervision of trading. On January 1, 2006, Croatia introduced the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). There is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    26. There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and trading systems which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate balance between the demands of different market participants.

    In 2004, the former CSEC established a real-time trade monitoring system at the ZSE and VSE. According to the 2004 CSEC Annual Report, the new system enabled the CSEC to carry out full and comprehensive supervision of trading. On January 1, 2006, Croatia introduced the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). There is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    27. Regulation should promote transparency of trading.

    In 2004, the former CSEC established a real-time trade monitoring system at the ZSE and VSE. According to the 2004 CSEC Annual Report, the new system enabled the CSEC to carry out full and comprehensive supervision of trading. On January 1, 2006, Croatia introduced the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). There is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    28. Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices.

    In 2004, the former CSEC established a real-time trade monitoring system at the ZSE and VSE. According to the 2004 CSEC Annual Report, the new system enabled the CSEC to carry out full and comprehensive supervision of trading. On January 1, 2006, Croatia introduced the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). There is insufficient information publicly available as to the CFSSA's compliance with this principle.

    29. Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption.

    In 2004, the former CSEC established a real-time trade monitoring system at the ZSE and VSE. According to the 2004 CSEC Annual Report, the new system enabled the CSEC to carry out full and comprehensive supervision of trading. On January 1, 2006, Croatia introduced the CFSSA, which, pursuant to the 2006 Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, assumed the responsibilities and competencies of the former CSEC, Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority, and the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Insurance (EBRD 2007). There is insufficient information publicly available as to Croatia's compliance with this principle.

    30. Systems for clearing and settlement of securities transactions should be subject to regulatory oversight, and designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that they reduce systemic risk.

    In its 2002 FSSA, the IMF concluded that the "current systems for clearing and settlement of securities are efficient, safe, and effective" (p. 39). However, according to the 2004 IMF update, Croatia has not transferred the majority ownership of the Securities Depository Agency (SDA) from the state to the private sector, as recommended by the IMF in 2002.

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    Sources of Assessment

    European Bank for Restructuring and Development, "Securities Markets Legislation Assessment Project - 2005 Update," May 2005. Available from European Bank for Restructuring and Development website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (EBRD 2005)

    European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Commercial Laws of Croatia - An Assessment by the EBRD," 2007. Available from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (EBRD 2007)

    International Monetary Fund, "Republic of Croatia: Financial System Stability Assessment, Including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topics: Banking Supervision, Payment Systems, Securities Regulation, Insurance Regulation and Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency," Country Report 02/180, Washington, D.C.: IMF, August 2002. Available from International Monetary Fund website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (IMF 2002)

    International Monetary Fund, "Republic of Croatia: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes - Banking Supervision, Payment Systems, and Securities Regulation - Update," Country Report No. 04/252, Washington, D.C.: IMF, August 2004. Available from International Monetary Fund website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (IMF 2004)

    Relevant Organizations

    Central Depository Agency - Središnja depozitarna agencija d.d. (CDA)

    Croatian Association of Accountants and Financial Experts- Računovodstvo i financije (CAAFE) (in Croatian only)

    Croatian Chamber of Auditors - Hrvatska Revizorska Komora (CCA)

    Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency - Hrvatska Agencija Za Nadzor Financijskih Usluga (CFSSA)

    Croatian National Bank - Hrvatska Narodna Banka (CNB)

    Croatian Securities and Exchange Commission - Hrvatska Agencija Za Nadzor Financijskih Usluga (CSEC)

    Financial Reporting Standards Board (FRSB)

    Insurance Companies Supervisory Authority (ICSA)

    Ministry of Finance - Ministarstvo Financija (MoF)

    Varaždin Stock Exchange - Varaždinska Burza (VSE)

    Zagreb Stock Exchange - Zagrebačka Burza (ZSE)



    Relevant Legislation/Regulation

    Securities Market Law, 2002

    Law on the Takeover of Joint Stock Companies, 2002

    Investment Funds Law, 1995

    Amendments to the Investment Funds Law, 2001

    Act on the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, 2006

    Law on Privatization Investment Funds, 1997

    Amendments of the Law on Privatization Investment Funds, 2001

    Company Law, 1995



    Supplementary Sources

    Croatian Securities and Exchange Commission "Summary of the Annual Report for 2004,", January 2005. Available from Croatian Securities and Exchange Commissionwebsite. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (CSEC 2005)

    Deloitte & Touche Tohmasu IAS Plus website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (Deloitte IAS Plus website)

    European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "EBRD Corporate Governance Sector Assessment Project - 2004 Assessment: Croatia," April 2007. Available from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (EBRD 2004)

    International Organization of Securities Commissions website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (IOSCO website)

    PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Guide to Doing Business and Investing in Croatia," 2006. Available from PricewaterhouseCoopers website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (PwC 2006)

    World Bank, "Croatia: Report on the Observance of the Standards and Codes (ROSC) - Accounting and Auditing," June 2002. Available from World Bank website. Accessed on July 24, 2007. (WB 2002)